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ABSTRACT
Upcoming WiFi-based localization systems for indoor envi-
ronments face a conflict of privacy interests: Server-side lo-
calization violates location privacy of the users, while local-
ization on the user’s device forces the localization provider
to disclose the details of the system, e.g., sophisticated clas-
sification models. We show how Secure Two-Party Compu-
tation can be used to reconcile privacy interests in a state-of-
the-art localization system. Our approach provides strong
privacy guarantees for all involved parties, while achieving
room-level localization accuracy at reasonable overheads.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, WiFi-based localization systems are increas-
ingly considered for indoor environments. Users only need
a WiFi-capable device to repeatedly supply received signal
strength indicator (RSSI) measurements, which are matched
against a signal propagation model on the server side. Thus,
these approaches promise better usability than approaches
that require users to carry special devices. However, the sys-
tem provider can track the user which gives rise for serious
concerns, especially when deployed in sensitive areas such
as hospitals. To overcome these concerns, the localization
could be performed directly on the user’s device (similar to
GPS). As indoor environments are more challenging than
outdoors, e.g., due to heavy multi-path signal propagation,
sophisticated signal propagation models and carefully cali-
brated localization algorithms are required to achieve rea-
sonable localization accuracy. However, this information is
potentially private to the system provider, e.g., the business
secret of a small start-up developing indoor localization sys-
tems. The user’s concern for location privacy and the busi-
ness interests of the system provider leave us with a dilemma
and the problem statement of this paper: How can the sys-
tem provider localize the user i) without learning the user’s
location (user privacy) and ii) without the user learning the
provider’s localization models (server privacy)?
In this paper, we show how to realize a state-of-the-art lo-
calization system based on Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
[5] in a privacy-preserving way using Secure Two-Party Com-
putation (STPC). As a partial result, we outline how to im-
plement the Viterbi decoder for HMMs more efficiently than
previous works [1]. For the first time, we also present a pro-
totype implementation and preliminary evaluation results
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Figure 1: Overview of the localization system. Values
in brackets are encrypted and computed using STPC.
which show that our approach achieves room-level accuracy
at a localization frequency of one per 10 seconds, which is
practical for many indoor location-based services.
2. SYSTEM & PROTOCOL DESIGN
The system presented in [5] models a user’s unknown se-
quence of positions as states of a HMM and uses the Viterbi
decoder to determine the most likely path based on the user’s
supplied RSSI measurements. The authors show that the
algorithm is more accurate than simple nearest-neighbour
approaches, for which privacy-preserving variants have been
widely discussed [4]. Thus, we consider the challenge to re-
design the HMM-based approach from [5] for privacy.
Figure 1 gives a short overview of our localization sys-
tem and protocol. As the user moves around the scene, she
periodically makes observations, i.e., RSSI measurements
rt,t=1..T from D access points (APs) in her vicinity. She
encrypts the observations and sends them to the server.
The server has trained a HMM λ that can be used to it-
eratively infer the user’s most likely position s∗t ∈ S based
on her observations rt,t=1..T . This optimization problem
is solved using the well known Viterbi algorithm: In each
timestep t = 0...T , we compute the probabilities ϑt(si) of
being in state si after having observed r0, ..., rt. Due to
the Markov property, ϑt(si) depends only on the previous
state and can be derived as shown in Figure 1. After each
step, we send the most probable current position s∗t to the
user. Note that for technical reasons, we work in negative
log-space thereby transforming the maximization to mini-
mization problem, where the ϑt(si) values represent costs.
The challenge now is to carry out the described compu-
tations on the user’s encrypted inputs. Here, we make use
of STPC protocols. STPC allows two parties with private
inputs x and y to compute a functionality f(x, y) without
revealing anything to each other except the result of the
computation. In our case, the desired functionality is the
Viterbi algorithm and the output a sequence of encrypted
positions that only the user can decrypt. To implement this,
we build on standard STPC protocols based on homomor-
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phic encryption [3, 4]. The homomorphic property allows to
perform additions and scalar multiplications on cipher texts
efficiently without interaction. Other operations, such as
multiplication of cipher texts as well as minimum selection,
require interaction with the user’s device and are computa-
tionally more expensive. This needs to be considered in an
efficient protocol design. We now describe in more detail
how to execute the algorithm’s steps privately using STPC.
Inputs. The private inputs of the user are the periodic
RSSI measurements rt = (rt1, ..., rtD) taken from D APs.
The server’s private input is the HMM λ = (S, V,A,B, pi)
modelling the indoor environment. The user encrypts her
measurements before sending them to the server to protect
her privacy. The server uses its own inputs in clear but
blinds any intermediate values during interactive protocol
steps to protect the parameters of the HMM. We write en-
crypted or blinded values in square brackets.
Emission probabilities. Probabilities p(rt|si) are mod-
elled as multi-variate gaussians centred around the mean
RSSI µsid of AP d at state si which is known only to the
server. By transforming into negative log-space and drop-
ping the constants, we get [p(rt|si)] = ∑Dd=1([rtd] − µsid)2.
Since [rtd] is encrypted, squaring requires one interactive
multiplication. To make this more efficient, the user also
supplies [r2td] upfront. The server can then efficiently com-
pute locally [p(rt|si)] = [r2td]− 2µsid[rtd] + µ2sid.
Solving the optimzation problem. We need to com-
pute the costs ϑt(si) ∀si ∈ S of placing a user at position
si in time step t (Fig. 1). Computing the arguments to
the min function requires only local additions and subtrac-
tions. This leaves us with computing the min function (and
the argmin to allow backtracking of the optimal path later).
While the basic problem of comparison has been widely stud-
ied in the literature, composing comparisons to efficient min
and argmin algorithms has received less attention. Proposed
algorithms compute in a tree-like fashion pairwise compar-
isons, i.e., [b] ← Less-Than([x], [y]), and then use the en-
crypted result [b] in two interactive multiplications to select
the smaller element as [b] ∗ [x] + (1 − [b]) ∗ [y]. We achieve
significant performance improvements by adapting the very
efficient Multi-Party Less-Than protocol proposed from [2]
to the Two-Party case and additionally interleaving the com-
parisons with the minimum selection step.
Updating the user’s position: Finally, we run the
argmin algorithm over all [ϑt(si)], si ∈ S to determine the
most likely position of the user [s∗i ] at time t which is then,
still under encryption, sent to the user. The user, in posses-
sion of the private key, can then decrypt her position.
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS
We have prototypically implemented the proposed algo-
rithm in Python 2.7 based on the GMP big integer library
and the Paillier crypto system. User and server communi-
cate over a Gigabit LAN with a delay of ≈ 1ms.
Processing and communication overheads. The over-
all complexity of the localization algorithm is O(T ·N ·N ′)
where T is the number of time steps, N is the number of
possible states, and N ′ is the number of predecessors per
state. Assuming realistic movement models, e.g., no transi-
tion through walls, no huge jumps, we get N ′ << N . We
have analyzed the average overheads of one location update
for different N and N ′ using a fixed number of D = 20 ac-
cess points. For N = 160 states with N ′ = 5 predecessors,
one fresh position can be computed in roughly 10 seconds.
Increasing N and N ′, as expected, increases runtime ap-
prox. linearly. Using more access points, i.e., increasing D,
increases overheads only slightly since it impacts only local
computations. The communication overhead is in the order
of a few MBs for the described setup.
Localization Accuracy. In principal, our approach can
achieve the same accuracy as the original system [5], since
the application of STPC does not per se introduce impre-
cision. Practically, numeric precision and processing and
communication overheads limit the accuracy.
Aliasgari et al. claim in [1] that HMM computation re-
quires precise floating point arithmetic to handle the in-
volved products of small probabilities. However, their pro-
posed floating point primitives for two-/multi-party com-
putation are computationally prohibitively expensive in the
context of HMM computation. Thus, instead of implement-
ing real support for floating point arithmetic in STPC, we
follow [5] and apply a negative log-space transformation,
which reduces the requirements for point arithmetic in our
scenario. As experiments show, accuracy does not signif-
icantly increase when considering more than five decimal
places. Such precision can be provided under STPC by sim-
ply scaling all inputs to the integers before encryption.
More limiting are the high computational costs of the
STPC protocols, which bound the number of states we can
handle without prohibitive delays. However, the number of
states directly determines accuracy. The original system [5]
separates the space into 40 × 40 × 40 cm3 voxels amount-
ing to thousands of states in their test setup, while we can
only handle up to, e.g., 160 states within a reasonable de-
lay of 10s. Still, this number of states is enough to achieve
room-level accuracy in medium sized indoor environments.
Security and Privacy. The used STPC protocols are se-
cure against semi-honest adversaries. User location privacy
is preserved since the server never sees the user’s inputs in
clear. Server privacy is protected since the user learns noth-
ing about the HMM except a few mappings from observa-
tions to positions, which is inevitable in our scenario.
4. CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK
We have motivated and designed a privacy preserving
state-of-the-art WiFi-based indoor localization system and,
for the first time, presented an actual implementation of the
Viterbi decoder using Secure Two-Party Computation. Our
preliminary results indicate that our approach is feasible for
achieving room-level accuracy with position updates in near
real time. The main issue is the performance of the algo-
rithm. We expect that using more efficient STPC primitives
such as Garbled Circuits for the min and argmin algorithms
can significantly increase performance and with it accuracy.
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